



# Small Utility, Big Target: Understanding and Defeating Cyber Threats


Dawn Cappelli  
Director OT-CERT, Dragos Inc.  
Former CISO, Rockwell Automation

# My Background



## Westinghouse

Software Engineer – nuclear power plants



## Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute CERT Program

Cybersecurity Research – insider threat / critical infrastructure protection



## Rockwell Automation

Insider Risk Director -> Chief Information Security Officer



**RETIRED!**



## Dragos

Director of OT-CERT



Safeguarding Civilization

**OT Security Technology Platform**

Expertise integrated into software to reduce OT risk

**A Community-Focused Mission**


Building skills & communications to strengthen the collective defense

**Expert OT Intelligence & Service Resources**

OT expert analysts, threat hunters, & responders to help you win the fight.

# 8TH ANNUAL YEAR IN REVIEW

FROM THE 2025 OT/ICS CYBERSECURITY REPORT



# Conflict-driven threat activity



**Ukraine-Russia**

**Israel-Hamas**

**Israel / Iran / US**

**Mounting tension between China and Taiwan**

- **Targeted operations against critical infrastructure**
- **Hacktivists cause panic & negatively impact public perception of the resilience of critical services**
- **Intelligence gathering & capability staging activity**

# CURRENT THREAT LANDSCAPE



STATE-  
SPONSORED  
THREAT GROUPS



“HACKTIVIST”  
GROUPS




CYBERCRIMINALS



# TWO NEW DRAGOS THREAT GROUPS

YEAR FIRST  
DISCOVERED



# China



# THREAT GROUP UPDATE: VOLTZITE

## PERSISTENT ACCESS TO INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE NETWORKS




“[Chinese government-linked hackers have burrowed into U.S. critical infrastructure and are waiting] ‘for just the right moment to deal a devastating blow.’”

“The CCP’s dangerous actions—China’s multi-pronged assault on our national and economic security—make it the defining threat of our generation.”



Oil &  
Natural Gas



Electric



Telecom



Water & Wastewater

# Success Story: LELWD Beat Voltzite - Follow Their Lead!





# LELWD vs VOLTZITE Case Study (Dragos Perspective)

1

Late 2023: U.S. water and electric utility implemented Dragos Platform and engaged Dragos industrial threat hunters

2

Dragos Platform and threat hunters discovered that early in 2023 VOLTZITE had compromised the utility and over the next 300+ days:

- exfiltrated details on operational processes, configurations of operational technology (OT) assets, geographic information system (GIS) data, SCADA system configurations, and lists of critical customers.
  - NOTE: Voltzite was not able to infiltrate the OT networks - historical or archival information stored on the file server was stolen
  - **VOLTZITE was focused on accessing and exfiltrating sensitive documents and data that are pivotal to critical operations of the electric utility.**

3


Dragos launched additional hunts across subscribed customers and Neighborhood Keeper and anonymously notified impacted parties.

# Iran



# NEW THREAT GROUP: BAUXITE (associated with CyberAv3ngers)

ICS ACTIONS AGAINST EASY-TO-ACCESS TARGETS



“Between November 2023 and January 2024, CyberAv3ngers targeted U.S.-based Unitronics PLC devices used in multiple critical infrastructure industries, including the WWS Sector, likely in four separate waves of cyberattacks. The actors compromised at least 75 devices, including at least 34 in the WWS Sector in the United States.”

*-- Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency*



# Russia



# CyberArmyofRussia\_Reborn



## PRESS RELEASES

### Treasury Sanctions Leader and Primary Member of the Cyber Army of Russia Reborn

“In January 2024, CARR claimed responsibility for the overflow of water storage tanks in Abernathy and Muleshoe, Texas, posting video of the manipulation of human-machine interfaces at each facility on a public forum. The compromise of the industrial control systems resulted in the loss of tens of thousands of gallons of water.

Additionally, CARR compromised the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system of a U.S. energy company, giving them control over the alarms and pumps for tanks in that system.”

# More Hacktivist Attacks on US Utilities



≡ **W I R E D**



NEWSLETTERS


[SUBSCRIBE](#)

BY ANDY GREENBERG SECURITY APR 17, 2024 6:00 AM

## Hackers Linked to Russia's Military Claim Credit for Sabotaging US Water Utilities

Cyber Army of Russia Reborn, a group with ties to the Kremlin's Sandworm unit, is crossing lines even that notorious cyberwarfare unit wouldn't dare to.





17:33:17  
17/01/2024

## USTAWIENIA PARAMETRÓW REAKTORA



pomiar

-1.0 mg/l

3.36 m

17 min 1 min 180 min 3 min **poziom max tlenu**

MAX: 23 MIN: 0

10

7 8 9 Clr Esc

4 5 6 BS Del

1 2 3 &lt; &gt;

. 0 - Enter

**poziom min tlenu****poziom max ścieków****czas nitryfikacji****czas denitryfikacji****czas sedimentacji****czas pomp. osadu****godzina cyklu dobowego**

# Ransomware




# RANSOMWARE ATTACKS BY SECTOR

RANSOMWARE ATTACKS INCREASED BY 87% IN 2024



## RANSOMWARE BY ICS SECTOR BASED ON PUBLIC THREAT INTEL SOURCES



**TOTAL: 1693 INCIDENTS**

## Ransomware Insights From Dragos Incident Response Cases



Involved full shutdown



Involved disruption to operations to some degree

# WHAT CAN GO WRONG: RANSOMWARE



## HOW TO FIX IT

Patch VPN vulnerabilities, enforce MFA

Restrict admin privileges, monitor access

Implement strict IT/OT segmentation

Deploy OT-native threat & anomaly detection

Conduct TTX, establish offline backups

## Ransomware Insights From Dragos Incident Response Cases



Involved some element of a remote service, such as a VPN appliance or remote desktop protocol (RDP) server being leveraged by adversaries.

Numerous ransomware groups are leveraging low-barrier-of-entry intrusion tactics against industrial organizations and capitalizing on a lack of basic network and security hygiene practices.

**Until these elements are addressed, ransomware groups will continue exploiting them.**

# NEW ICS MALWARE DISCOVERED



# FROSTYGOOP ICS MALWARE



## What happened?

In January 2024, during sub-zero temperatures, a cyber attack disrupted the energy supply for central heating in more than 600 apartment buildings in Ukraine.

Dragos discovered FrostyGoop in April 2024.

FrostyGoop interacts directly with industrial control systems (ICS) using Modbus TCP over port 502.

9<sup>th</sup>  
known ICS  
malware

1<sup>st</sup>  
known Modbus  
ICS malware  
that causes  
effects on ICS  
devices

46,000

Internet-exposed ICS devices  
communicating over Modbus TCP

*Modbus is used worldwide across industries.*


# CHERNOVITE'S PIPEDREAM (2022)

Evolution of ICS/OT malware



**FIRST** scalable, cross-industry OT attack framework (7<sup>TH</sup> overall ICS/OT specific)  
Discovered before it was employed for destructive purposes.

5



ICS PROTOCOLS ABUSED

FINS, MODBUS, CODESYS, OPC UA,  
Schneider Electric NetManage

100s



VENDORS IMPACTED


1000s



DEVICES POTENTIALLY IMPACTED

CAPABLE OF DISRUPTIVE & DESTRUCTIVE ICS CYBER ATTACKS

# TACTICS, TOOLS, & PROCEDURES



## New ICS Malware

is increasingly emerging; lack of visibility in OT conceals the full scope of attacks

## Internet-accessible OT devices


key attack path, highlighting need for simple changes to create more defensible architectures

## Remote Access

adversaries routinely exploit VPNs, SSH, default credentials, & third-party remote access.

## Lateral Spread After Compromise

adversaries use LOTL techniques, native tools, ICS protocols to evade detection.



What can you do??

# Free resources available NOW from Dragos



## WHY?

**Dragos  
Mission:  
Safeguarding  
Civilization**



**Utilities at Risk:**  
Under Resourced  
Water, Electric, & Gas

ALL Under Resourced  
Organizations with OT  
Environments

**Dragos  
Community  
Defense  
Program**

**Dragos  
OT-CERT**

# Dragos Community Defense Program (CDP)



Free OT cybersecurity  
software technology

For small water,  
electric, and natural gas  
providers

To help reduce risk  
of cyber events

Dragos Platform &  
other key resources

<\$100 million revenues

- Inventory assets
- Detect & hunt threats
- Manage vulnerabilities
- Respond to incidents

Register at:

[Dragos.com/community-defense-program](https://Dragos.com/community-defense-program)

Email us at:

[CDPInfo@dragos.com](mailto:CDPInfo@dragos.com)

# Dragos CDP: what's included



<b>Dragos Platform</b>		ICS/OT visibility & network monitoring (assets, threats, vulns) Includes Sensors and SiteStore, virtual models
<b>Neighborhood Keeper</b>		Anonymized community threat visibility amongst Platform users
<b>Threat Hunting Services</b>		CDP participant telemetry analyzed by OT expert threat hunters
<b>OT-CERT Membership</b>		Toolkits, guides, & members-only working sessions to improve cyber capability
<b>Dragos Academy</b>		On-demand training for OT security and Dragos Platform use
<b>Software Updates &amp; KnowledgePacks</b>		Latest functionality, threat detections, & vulnerabilities

# DRAGOS OT-CERT\*

Industrial cybersecurity resources  
for the OT community



## FREE CYBERSECURITY RESOURCES

Free content is available for OT asset owners and operators, to help you build and maintain an effective OT cybersecurity program.

## OPEN TO GLOBAL ICS/OT COMMUNITY

Content is oriented toward Small and Medium Businesses (SMBs) and resource-challenged organizations with OT environments that lack in-house expertise.

## NEW CONTENT

Members have access to a growing library of resources such as toolkits, guides, how-to videos, templates, best practice blogs, tabletop exercises and more, available from the OT-CERT portal.

## WORKING SESSIONS

Monthly virtual sessions are offered in 2 convenient time zones for members to get to know each other, ask questions, get advice, and share their successes and challenges.

## VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURES

We take a coordinated approach to the disclosure of vulnerabilities, working with vendors to better protect our customers and the ICS/OT community.

# Some OT-CERT Resources available now



OT Cybersecurity Fundamentals Self-Assessment



## Toolkits:

Asset Management  
Collection Management Framework  
Host-Based Logging  
Incident Response Plan  
OT Backups  
Secure Remote Access / MFA  
Network Segmentation  
Default Passwords and Internet-Exposed Devices  
System Hardening  
Firewall Configurations  
Change Management / Detection



Self-Service OT Ransomware Tabletop Toolkit



ICS/OT Cybersecurity Introductory Training, Guides, and Videos



OT-CERT Working Sessions



Best Practices Blog Series



Securing Leadership Support for OT Cybersecurity

# Don't Wait! Get Started Now!

75 free  
resources

~2,675  
members

64  
countries

OT-CERT is the  
Operational Technology —  
Cyber Emergency Readiness  
Team

Dedicated to addressing the  
OT resource gaps that exist in  
industrial infrastructure.



# Best Practices for Cybersecurity in OT



- 01 ICS Incident Response Plan
- 02 Defensible Architecture
- 03 ICS Network Monitoring Visibility
- 04 Secure Remote Access
- 05 Risk-based Vulnerability Management



Defense is  
**Doable**

And Together

We Can  
**Safeguard  
Civilization**